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Abstract
Under far-reaching reforms, many cities have delegated core tasks previously delivered by their
administrations to independent organisations that they formally own, e.g. municipal companies,
or supervise, e.g. municipal trust funds. The coordination of these (as we call them) ‘domestic’
city organisations has proven challenging. Extant literature argues that such coordination is
achieved through a mix of various hierarchical, market and network mechanisms. Yet it is unclear
how these modes are combined. Addressing this gap, we ask: How do governance modes interact
in the hybrid coordination of domestic city organisations? Analysing the case of Vienna, where
100 domestic organisations employ about 60,000 people, we find that while cultural mechanisms,
rooted in the network mode, are predominant, they unfold in the shadow of latent structural
mechanisms, which are associated with hierarchy and market. In the background, structural
mechanisms keep cultural coordination effective, while cultural mechanisms allow structural coor-
dination to remain (generally) hidden. This study aims to contribute to the literature on the gov-
ernance of public organisations by exploring the relationship between governance modes as well
as furthering urban governance studies by applying insights from studies on the coordination of
public organisations to the city context.
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Introduction
Far-reaching reforms over the past decades
under the mantra of New Public Management
(NPM) have greatly transformed the organi-
sational arrangements of cities (Harrison and
Hoyler, 2014; McCann, 2017; O’Brien and
Pike, 2019; amongst many others in this jour-
nal). As a consequence, public sectors in gen-
eral and cities in particular have transformed
from ‘centralized and consolidated’ entities to
‘decentralized, structurally devolved, and
‘‘autonomizing’’’ arenas (Verhoest et al., 2010:
3; see Bouckaert et al., 2010; Lægreid and
Rykkja, 2015; Lægreid et al., 2015, 2016).
Reflecting these structural transformations,
the administrative paradigm has shifted from
‘government’ to ‘governance’, emphasising the
delegation of core functions of city adminis-
trations to external actors (Brandtner et al.,
2017). Accordingly, ‘polycentricity’ (Ostrom,
2010) has become a particular feature of
municipalities, where the majority of public
services such as public transportation, water
supply, healthcare and social welfare are pro-
vided on the local level (Kuhlmann and
Wollmann, 2019).
Unsurprisingly, this shift has made the
issue of coordination, understood as ‘bring-
ing parts into a proper relation’ (see Hood,
2005: 19), a central theme in governance
studies. Indeed, scholars often refer to ‘gov-
ernance’ as the institutional capacity to coor-
dinate (Da Cruz et al., 2019; Peters and
Pierre, 2016). Coordination, sometimes
called the ‘holy grail’ (Rhodes, 2017) or ‘phi-
losopher’s stone’ (Lægreid et al., 2015) of
modern governing, encompasses attempts to
make polities more integrated by increasing
coherence as well as reducing redundancy,
lacunae and contradictions (Bouckaert et al.,
2010; Lægreid et al., 2015). Current debates
on governance emphasise ‘collaborative’
regimes (Cristofoli et al., 2017) of city
administrations with societal actors – such as
companies and non-profit organisations –
that are involved in policy implementation
and service delivery. Yet in continental
Europe, the dominant challenges to the
inter-organisational coordination of urban
administrations lie elsewhere, namely in
what we refer to as the ‘domestic’ sphere –
the plethora of independent organisations
created in the wake of NPM-inspired ‘agency
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fever’ (Pollitt et al., 2001), which together
form organisational ‘landscapes’ (Meyer and
Leixnering, 2015). In German cities, for
example, an average of 50% of people
engaged in municipal tasks are employed
outside the primary administration in sepa-
rate city organisations (Papenfuß et al.,
2019). We use ‘domestic’ to designate this
particular kind of city organisation, i.e. cor-
porate entities fully owned by the city as well
as entities under public law for which the city
holds supervisory rights similar to ownership
(agency ‘type 3’; Van Thiel, 2012). While leg-
ally independent, ‘domestic city organisa-
tions’ nonetheless ‘belong’ to a city in terms
of ownership (i.e. municipal companies) or
supervision (e.g. municipal trust funds). The
expression ‘domestic’ implies that such enti-
ties are integral parts of a city’s organisa-
tional ‘household’.
The coordination of domestic city organi-
sations sits between top-down control of
internal, administrative units and voluntary
cooperation with external actors. With
regard to involved mechanisms, it is also
located between the governance modes of
hierarchy, market and network. Scholars
emphasise that such coordination does not
occur via a single mode but rather via a
hybrid mix of different mechanisms, which
may be competing, inconsistent and even
contradictory (Denis et al., 2015; Lægreid
and Rykkja, 2015; Sarapuu et al., 2014).
Coordination remains a somewhat ‘ambigu-
ous’ concept (Lægreid et al., 2015: 928) in
governance studies. In particular, it is still a
puzzle how different hierarchical, market
and network mechanisms are combined and
how these modes relate to each other in
domestic coordination (Cristofoli et al.,
2017; Lægreid et al., 2016). Drawing on the
literature of organisation theory and public
administration, we aim to address this gap
by asking: How do governance modes interact
in the hybrid coordination of domestic city
organisations?
We investigate this by studying the case
of Vienna. With about 100 domestic city
organisations and a total of around 90,000
employees, the Austrian capital is a prime
example of a structurally devolved city.
Vienna’s generally effective coordination is
reflected in its top position in global rank-
ings for quality of life, since 2009 taking first
place in a list compiled by Mercer and also
being named by the Economist as the world’s
most liveable city in 2018 and 2019.
Addressing the call for in-depth research
into the workings of coordination (Lægreid
and Rykkja, 2015), our study analyses how
structural mechanisms of hierarchy and the
market are interwoven with cultural mechan-
isms usually associated with the network
mode. Based on our findings, we make three
propositions: First, cultural mechanisms are
dominant while structural ones are latent.
Second, this latency accounts for a ‘shadow’ of
structures that needs to be regularly main-
tained through demonstrations of power.
Finally, cultural and structural mechanisms
are mutually dependent: Cultural mechanisms
normally stand in for structural coordination,
which in isolation would exhaust itself, while
structural mechanisms provide the shadow in
which cultural coordination thrives.
The remainder of this article is organised
as follows: In the next section, we describe
our conceptual framework, followed by an
outline of the empirical setting and research
methods. Then we present our findings and
discuss these in the light of existing literature,
before offering some concluding remarks.
Conceptual framework
Coordination as integration
In classical organisational theory, coordina-
tion is equivalent to the issue of ‘integration’
(Bouckaert et al., 2010; Lægreid et al.,
2015). Accordingly, the design of organisa-
tional settings requires that differentiation,
i.e. the division of labour (‘segmentation of
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the organizational system into subsystems’),
be balanced with integration as ‘the process
of achieving unity of effort among the vari-
ous subsystems’ (Lawrence and Lorsch,
1967: 3–4). ‘[T]he higher the level of differen-
tiation, the greater and more complex the
range and forms of integration should be’
(Hinings et al., 2018: 339). From this per-
spective, the transition from government to
governance represents a process of immense
structural differentiation, imposing a
demand for coordination in order to coun-
terbalance devolution and ensure that cities
remain ‘integrated entities’ (Lægreid and
Rykkja, 2015: 961). In the wider literature
on organisations (Mintzberg, 1983; Powell,
1990) as well as scholarly work on the gov-
ernance of public organisations (Bouckaert
et al., 2010; Lægreid et al., 2015), the discus-
sion of different forms of coordination has
focused on three distinct governance modes –
hierarchy, market and network.
Hierarchy. This is the traditional coordination
mode of public administration. Associated
with Weberian bureaucracy and a vertical logic
of command-and-control, it builds on formal
authority via administrative orders and rules as
a basis for interaction. Drawing on the ‘ability
to get things done without opposition’, collec-
tive goals are set in a vertical top-down manner
and coercive power is applied to meet these
(Bouckaert et al., 2010: 37). Such power may
be exercised in the form of legislation and regu-
lation as well as by other mandates involving
imperative objective setting, unilateral decisions
and coercion (Börzel and Risse, 2010; Scharpf,
1997; Voets et al., 2015).
Market. The market-oriented ‘restructuring’
of cities (Brenner and Theodore, 2005) has
been a key element of ‘neoliberal’ urban
reform agendas (Harvey, 1989; for an over-
view, see Pinson and Journel, 2016).
Promoted by NPM-inspired reforms as an
alternative coordination mode, the market is
a ‘heterarchical’ (i.e. horizontal) counterpart
to hierarchy. Rooted in new institutional
economics, the focus is on producing desired
outcomes through the exchange of products
for financial return, with competition as a
core element (Lægreid et al., 2015).
Organisations are geared towards economic
performance through strict budgets, indica-
tors and audits (Bouckaert et al., 2010).
Here, bargaining between equal partners is a
basic process (Williamson, 1996). Contracts
between buyers and sellers specify clear
objectives, targets and sanctions if con-
tracted activities are not provided (Van
Thiel et al., 2012). By definition, hierarchical
mechanisms are diminished in contractual
relations, with no one party exerting formal
authority (i.e. buyers and sellers are regarded
as ‘autonomous’; see Williamson, 1996).
Networks. In contrast to the formal arrange-
ments of hierarchical and market modes,
whose mechanisms are termed ‘structural’ in
the literature (Lægreid et al., 2015), mechan-
isms from the network mode build upon
informal resources of individuals and are
referred to as ‘cultural’. Similar to markets,
the network mode functions without the
benefit of formal authority (Provan and
Kenis, 2008), instead drawing on social
mechanisms such as solidarity, trust and
mutual cooperation (Hood, 2005; Peters,
2015; Powell, 1990). In organisational
research, social systems associated with this
third mode of coordination have been
referred to as ‘clans’ (Ouchi, 1979). Over the
years, a number of studies have been con-
ducted on informal means of coordination
in public administration (for overviews,
see Bouckaert et al., 2010; Hood, 2005).
Broadly speaking, informal cultural patterns
are seen to strengthen integration by supple-
menting and bypassing formal structures.
Here, collective action is rooted in shared
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goals, common norms and values and strong
identification and identity. Extant scholar-
ship on the governance of public organisa-
tions emphasises the central role of
socialisation, which is supposed to eliminate
goal incongruence (Hood, 2005; Lægreid
and Rykkja, 2015).
Domestic coordination: Hybrid, yet
ambiguous
In applying these conceptual perspectives to
domestic coordination, we encounter a
dilemma: Domestic city organisations can-
not be controlled by a hierarchical ‘étatiste
approach’ (Peters, 2015) as they are not part
of a city’s primary administrative regime.
Nevertheless, the regime possesses formal
authority in terms of ownership and supervi-
sion. While this authority stands in opposi-
tion to the modes of market (Williamson,
1996) and network (Provan and Kenis,
2008), NPM-inspired reforms have, how-
ever, promoted contractual relations
between the core administration and city
organisations. At the same time, cultural
mechanisms such as mutual trust or shared
goals and values (sometimes referred to as
‘soft’ or ‘social’; see Hood, 2005) have
become core elements in debates on the gov-
ernance of public organisations (Meyer
et al., 2018; Van Thiel and Yesilkagit, 2011).
In end effect, domestic coordination cannot
be fully explained by the hierarchical, mar-
ket or network modes in isolation; rather, it
features mechanisms from each.
In discussing alternative practices in the
coordination of public organisations, recent
literature has abandoned the notion of
mutually exclusive coordination modes.
Rather, it has been suggested that domestic
coordination may involve all three govern-
ance modes (Lægreid et al., 2015; Sarapuu
et al., 2014; Voets et al., 2015). This reflects
recent findings on the hybridisation of urban
governance (O’Brien and Pike, 2019);
moreover, it echoes earlier governance
research arguing that all coordination is a
mix of mechanisms from the ‘pure’ modes of
hierarchy, market and network (Börzel and
Risse, 2010; Mayntz, 2004). The key
resource of bureaucracy, i.e. the civil service,
is a good example. Commonly associated
with structural hierarchy, some of its key
characteristics are in fact cultural, thereby
relating to the network mode (Hood, 2005).
In Weberian bureaucracies, these include a
shared official ethos favouring public inter-
est (Meyer et al., 2014), as well as clan fea-
tures resulting from long careers in the same
administration and informal (social) links
between individual staff members
(Bouckaert et al., 2010).
Normative approaches, in particular,
have either identified governance modes
with competing administrative paradigms of
public administration (‘hierarchy’), NPM
(‘market’) and public governance (‘network’,
Osborne, 2010), or treated associated
mechanisms as alternative forms of ‘joined-
up governance’ (Hood, 2005) or ‘whole-of-
government’ (Christensen and Lægreid,
2007). More recent studies, however, have
identified coordination as hybrid, mixed or
multidimensional, involving a shift between
modes or drawing on combinations of
mechanisms from different modes (Denis
et al., 2015; Lægreid et al., 2016; Polzer
et al., 2016). The ‘magic’ of domestic coordi-
nation thus transcends the idea of a single
integrative mode. Rejecting exclusive
choices, it demands the dynamic interplay of
– sometimes competing, inconsistent and
contradictory (Lægreid and Rykkja, 2015) –
mechanisms, each rooted in one of the three
governance modes (Börzel and Risse, 2010).
This shifting between or mixing of gov-
ernance modes in order to ensure effective
coordination has been referred to as ‘meta-
governance’ (Bevir, 2009; Kooiman and
Jentoft, 2009). Accordingly, ‘smart’ coordi-
nation results from the decision of the
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‘meta-governor’, i.e. the administration
(Sørensen and Torfing, 2009), when to go
‘hands on’, i.e. adopt a structural approach,
and when to go ‘hands off’, i.e. rely on cul-
tural mechanisms (Voets et al., 2015).
Addressing ‘urban informality’, a feature
usually associated with the network mode of
coordination, scholars have recently criti-
cised the simplistic dualism of formal vs.
informal, whereby the former is generally
viewed as superior to the latter, arguing for
a rejection of the simplistic ‘othering’ of
informality (Acuto et al., 2019). This argu-
ment also holds for the relationship between
structural and cultural coordination, where
the discounting of cultural mechanisms as
non-structural should be replaced by a more
nuanced perspective of both dimensions as
interrelated in domestic coordination.
However, there is still no clear and easy
answer (Cristofoli et al., 2017; Voets et al.,
2015) to the question: How are structural
and cultural mechanisms combined in the
coordination of public organisations? In
order to open the black box of ambiguous
and contested hybrid coordination (Lægreid
et al., 2015; see also Lægreid et al., 2016), we
must examine the relationship between the
governance modes more closely.
In general, the literature on the govern-
ance of public organisations has focused on
the central government tier, with scarcely
any studies considering the urban context
(Bjørnå et al., 2017; Van Genugten et al.,
2020). Yet cities provide crucial case studies
as they constitute particularly ‘dense’ polities
(Sassen, 2006), not least in terms of the pub-
lic tasks they typically fulfil in the continen-
tal-European context such as energy supply,
health and social care, water provision and
public transportation (Kuhlmann and
Wollmann, 2019). A significant number of
domestic city organisations are required to
provide these services. In addition, domestic
coordination at the city level may differ con-
siderably from that at the federal level due
to the more restricted legislative authority of
urban administrations, limiting their options
for hierarchical coordination.
Empirical setting, data and
method
The empirical context: Vienna
When the Vienna city administration imple-
mented far-reaching NPM reforms in the
1990s and early 2000s, there was strong
resistance from politicians and the public to
the privatisation of services. As an alterna-
tive, the creation of domestic city organisa-
tions developed as a core element of so-
called Binnenreformen (Bogumil et al., 2007)
that became typical for not only Austria and
Germany but also continental Europe. In
order to make organisational arrangements
more business-like, many service-delivering
units were hived off from the administrative
corpus and established as independent orga-
nisations. Covering a wide range of services,
an extensive organisational landscape
emerged in Vienna, comprising more than
250 separate units (about 100 domestic city
organisations and 150 companies of which
the city is part-owner) on the first and sec-
ond subsidiary level. Some of the biggest
domestic organisations are the municipal
hospitals,1 the city’s social fund, two holding
companies (including the city’s energy and
public transportation providers) as well as
the tourism agency. As the national capital,
Vienna follows Austria’s Rechtsstaat tradi-
tion, featuring a robust bureaucratic system
that builds on legal procedures and direc-
tives as well as a strong professional ethos of
civil servants enjoying lifelong tenure (Meyer
et al., 2014). Nevertheless, the vast majority
of city organisations were established as cor-
porations (and only the minority as entities
based in public law), enabling them to oper-
ate beyond the legal restrictions that bind
public administrations. This diverse
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institutional background reflects the typical
hybridity that the literature attributes to
modern urban governance but also consider-
able ambiguity about the interaction of gov-
ernance modes in the coordination of city
organisations.
In terms of size, the City of Vienna repre-
sents a ‘critical case’ (Patton, 2015) that can
exemplify central aspects of contemporary
urban governance. With an annual budget
of more than e16 billion, Vienna’s public
administration employs about 30,000 people;
a further 60,000 staff work for domestic city
organisations in areas such as health and
social care, social housing and public trans-
port, together accounting for an additional
annual budget of around e5 billion (City of
Vienna, 2019). In contrast, the mayor of
London oversees a total budget of less than
e20 billion for a population almost five
times bigger (i.e. 8.9 vs. 1.9 million). While
such a comparison between cities is under-
mined by considerable disparities between
administrative models, the figures nonethe-
less underline why Vienna is a critical case.
Since the First World War, the Social-
Democratic Party (SPÖ) has dominated the
city government, the only exception being
during the Austro-fascist and Nazi years of
1934–1945. This makes Vienna an ‘extreme
case’ (Seawright and Gerring, 2008) of polit-
ical stability. We argue that such ‘special-
ness’ (Siggelkow, 2007) offers particular
insights from which it is possible to draw
general conclusions. The assumption is that
while more contested political settings may
be equally hybrid, any observations are
likely to be distorted by political ‘noise’. In
view of the named features, Vienna presents
a good case for studying the interaction of
governance modes in the hybrid coordina-
tion of city organisations.
In detail, the city administration
(Magistrat) of Vienna is structured as a
matrix organisation. It is divided into five
functional executive groups, each led by an
executive director. Executive directors report
to the chief executive director (CEO), the
city’s highest-ranking civil servant. Further,
the administration is divided into seven
cross-functional administrative groups, each
led by a city councillor. Only a few units do
not follow this divisional structure (e.g. the
chief executive office and the city’s court of
audit). Every administrative group is seg-
mented into departments (60 in total). All
department heads report both to their
respective city councillor and to the CEO;
the directors of the executive groups have
the right to issue directives to the depart-
ment heads. Administrative groups enjoy a
certain latitude in dealing with managerial
and financial issues. Department-level per-
formance contracts and group-level lump-
sum budgets were introduced in 2001 in
order to increase management autonomy.
Budget overruns are only granted in special
cases and require the approval of the finance
director (CFO), who holds a hybrid position
within the city: s/he leads the financial
department while simultaneously acting as
executive director of one of the five execu-
tive groups. According to its statute, the
city’s financial department is the central unit
formally responsible for governance tasks
not assigned to another department.
Data, method and analysis
We adopted a twofold strategy of data col-
lection for the purpose of triangulation.
First, we collected information specifying
the composition of the city’s organisational
landscape by analysing governance-related
documents. These documents also play an
important role in urban governance by func-
tioning as boundary objects or ‘actants’
around which relationships establish and
events unfold.2 In our analysis, we drew on
legal documents such as acts and directives
that regulate administrative coordination
(source: government’s legal information
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system), statutory documents, annual
reports and the board composition of city
organisations (sources: commercial register
and organisations’ websites) as well as audit
reports (source: city’s court of audit). This
enabled us to create a database of all domes-
tic city organisations on the first and second
subsidiary level for the government term of
2010–2015. Second, we supplemented these
materials with primary data from interviews
with 23 key actors, conducted by the first
and second author during the same period.
In selecting interviewees, we identified two
relevant groups: core officials from the city
administration and top executives from city
organisations. Specifically, our interviewees
included 10 core officials from an adminis-
trative group or department as well as from
the chief executive office (including the CEO
and CFO of the city); a further 11 intervie-
wees were CEOs in a domestic city organisa-
tion (assumed to hold positions key to the
coordination of city organisations). In order
to account for the heterogeneity of city orga-
nisations, we selected organisations that dif-
fered in size, strategic relevance of the tasks
performed and public visibility. In addition,
we interviewed the director of the city’s
court of audit and the chairperson of the city
employees’ labour union. The interviewees
were guaranteed full anonymity given the
perceived sensitive nature of the shared
information.
The semi-structured interviews lasted 60
to 90 minutes. The primary aim was to
obtain insights into the governance struc-
tures relating to the coordination of domes-
tic city organisations. Therefore, we asked
interviewees about the intensity and fre-
quency of contact between the administra-
tion and city organisations, their respective
counterparts, strategy development, steering
and reporting activities, organisational cul-
ture, the characteristics of the prevailing sys-
tem and their individual backgrounds. The
interviewees named other relevant interview
partners and supplied non-public documen-
tation. The interviews were not tape-
recorded to encourage the interviewees to
speak openly. However, to ensure the great-
est possible accuracy, each interview was
conducted by two of the authors, who each
took extensive notes (including direct
quotes) during and immediately after the
session. Afterwards, these notes were com-
pared and consolidated in written interview
reports.
To analyse our data and structure our
findings, we followed the method suggested
by Gioia et al. (2012). In a first step, we
inductively identified and then grouped rele-
vant themes from the documents and inter-
view reports, staying close to the original
wording. Focusing on similarities and differ-
ences, we reduced these themes to 14 first-
order concepts. With the governance modes
in mind (see conceptual framework), we
examined these concepts from a more theo-
retical angle in a second step, condensing
them into six underlying second-order
themes. From this, our third step was to dis-
til two aggregate dimensions of domestic
coordination: ‘rule of people and culture’
and ‘shadow of structures’ (see data struc-
ture in Table 1). The extraction of a more
abstract level has been described as an ‘ana-
lytic generalization’ technique (Yin, 2013:
321) to address possible issues of validity
and generalisation in case study findings. In
the following, we organise our findings
along this data structure while providing
direct quotations from interviewees (denoted
by the letters a–w).
Findings: The rule of people and
culture in the shadow of
structures
Central control is elusive
According to one experienced official, cen-
tral administrative control of the ‘highly
8 Urban Studies 00(0)
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diversified conglomerate’ of city organisations
is ‘elusive’ (interviewee i). Not only does the
city administration lack ‘direct access’ and
‘overview’, it is also deficient in the authority
and information to control city organisations
via directives and contracts (a, j, k, t, u).
Therefore, several interviewees referred to the
need for alternative mechanisms to facilitate
city governance. Considering the size of the
city and its organisational landscape, two
executives asked rhetorically: ‘Is there actually
anyone who could supervise so many people?’
(d, k).
Further, interviewees claimed that the
status quo may be perceived as ‘messy’ from
a traditional perspective (j), as the adminis-
trative apparatus is itself ‘completely frag-
mented’ internally (f). One experienced
interviewee noted that, while the city admin-
istration has always been heterogeneous, it
was now ‘super decentral’ (m). According to
the city’s statute, the coordination of a city
organisation is a core task to be performed by
either the financial department or another
assigned department. However, one official
told us that in fact there is no single centre
responsible for governing city organisations
(f). Rather, there exist multiple relevant cen-
tres (the ‘triangle’ as s/he put it). This ‘histori-
cally grown’ arrangement (w) involves the
respective administrative group, the financial
department and the chief executive office,
each pushing in different directions regarding
service quality, good press, a stable financial
position and compliance with administrative
guidelines. Regarding her/his counterparts in
the administration, one executive said that s/
he feels ‘kind of sandwiched between different
interests’ (v) due to the administration’s lack
of a central unit to align or even oversee all
coordination activities (t).
Dominance of identity and clan
Officials shared their impression that the
coordinative mechanisms for city
organisations differ considerably from a
bureaucratic apparatus. The interviewees
did not call for centralised, authority-based
decision-making, but shared their conviction
that many things are better kept at arm’s
length. When an experienced executive men-
tioned that s/he is ‘on common ground’, the
city ‘can count on that’ (g), this echoes the
implicit, shared ethos of executives and offi-
cials, whereby the ‘meta-objectives are not
explicit’ (b) but are formulated in ways such
as ‘use resources efficiently to maintain
social freedom’ (j). The objectives derived
from such an ideal for the different tasks
performed by city organisations do not have
to be formalised at an organisational level; if
existent at all, strategies formulated by the
administration are rather abstract and vague
(a, s). As one executive put it, ‘we don’t wait
for political orders’ (a). Echoing this, an
official stated that ‘you can expect from
well-paid executives that they make deci-
sions rather than take orders’ (u) – things
can be managed locally, but ‘with a global
perspective on the city’ (f).
Hence, coordination is primarily exer-
cised via individuals rather than structures
(p, t, u); and since ‘it’s all about people and
their attitudes’ (c), the selection of the ‘right’
people becomes the crucial means of control
(t). They should be ‘capable’ and ‘loyal’ to
the city and its ethos, as one executive (j) put
it, ‘but not obedient: There are situations
where you have to say ‘‘no’’ – and you can,
more often than one may assume’ (j).
Fundamentally, the right people are those
that are trusted – ‘you couldn’t slip a sheet
of paper between us’ (d). One necessary but
not sufficient condition frequently applied is
that executives ‘come from the city’ (g), i.e.
have worked in the city administration
before. Recruiting outsiders is seen as poten-
tially risky: ‘We once had someone from
outside, an excellent professional – big mis-
take! It was as if he spoke another language’
(a). Hence, socialisation within the
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administration is a key requirement for exec-
utive appointments; they know how the city
‘works’ and are acquainted with their cur-
rent counterparts in the administration.
‘After 30 years in the city, you simply know
certain things’, one interviewee said, for
example ‘whom to call’ (u) and other practi-
calities (j). Further, ‘if you call the wrong
person three times in a certain situation, you
will remember that and learn’ (t). This is
how one builds networks over time (d, t).
Another official called the city administra-
tion an ‘occult science’, indicating that fel-
lowship requires secret knowledge and a
certain level of personal identification (b).
Informal communication
The benefits of communication ‘shortcuts’
were highlighted. One executive noted that
these ‘are not always bad: Sometimes you
need shortcuts’ (e). Indeed, informal chan-
nels of communication appear important
and legitimate, accounting for a substantial
informational flow between city officials and
executives (e), in particular for ‘things you
won’t find in files’ (v). According to another
executive (a), important messages seldom
come via formal channels, an observation
confirmed by one official: ‘Sure, you can do
it formally – but informally is better’ (f). An
important task of any official, s/he added, is
thus to ‘gain access to information through
different channels’. This means that execu-
tives will ‘of course pick up the phone when
the city councillor calls at night’ (r).
These diverse communication channels
are rather effective given that officials and
executives generally know whom to call.
This is reflected in the words of two execu-
tives, describing their contact to the chief
executive office: ‘We have no formal con-
tact, but we talk’ (a, c). While meetings may
therefore be institutionalised formal gather-
ings (b, g, j, k), in many cases they are more
informal and ad hoc in nature (a, s, r; ‘occa-
sionally, we might meet’: d).
Cultural coordination alone is ineffective
Although several officials pointed out that
coordination through formal structures was
elusive, and hence informal mechanisms
such as trust (d, k) were needed, they also
emphasised that such mechanisms alone
were insufficient. One official (u) reflected
that ‘city organisations are instruments of
the administration’ and officials should have
the authority to use them. Therefore, infor-
mal elements need to be ‘balanced’ with for-
mal ones (b, d), and a focus on people must
be complemented with structures in order to
be sustainable (g, i). The respective (but
unofficial) motto was ‘no more shortcuts!’
(with the emphasis on ‘more’: i), particularly
addressing executives’ love of speedy mea-
sures (c, k).
Shadow of vertical power
When and how officials from the adminis-
tration and executives from domestic city
organisations interact is ‘of course’ (o, p)
regulated by various standards and formal
manuals. For the administration, this
includes the city’s legal constitution as well
as procedural rules and the statute. In addi-
tion, the status of every city organisation
must be ‘legally determined’ (p), i.e. the
ownership of private entities or formal
supervision of public entities. The domestic
city organisations studied here have estab-
lished all legally stipulated bodies (e.g.
supervisory boards), follow binding govern-
ance regulations and give proper account of
their activities, e.g. through mandatory
financial reporting. In addition, officials
confirmed that delegates representing the
city in shareholder meetings or supervisory
boards ‘have their reporting assignments’ (o,
p). Whenever officials request information,
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executives of city organisations ‘are happy
to provide it’ (d).
The administration’s main expectation of
city organisations was formulated by one
executive as to ‘function well and make no
noise’ (s). Clearly, executives must know
how to handle delicate affairs, ‘when to talk
to the city councillor and when to decide on
your own’ (a). Indeed, our interviews
revealed the decentralised nature of decision-
making in city organisations, i.e. the admin-
istration plays only a minor role in strategy
development and hardly interferes with the
operations of city organisations (a, d, g, i, j,
s, u, v, w). Often there is no requirement for
detailed reporting so that formal reports
beyond basic legal requirements are not sub-
mitted (k) or are even regarded as ‘redun-
dant’ (d) from a coordinative perspective. In
several cases, officials mentioned that they
prefer not to receive too many details: ‘Do I
really want to know all that?’ (n, q). In many
cases, being ‘in the know’ requires appropri-
ate action, often leading to ‘dysfunctional-
ities’ (q). Another top official echoed this
standpoint by quoting a former CEO of
Siemens when it faced a series of scandals:
‘If we knew what we know!’ – however, add-
ing a question: ‘But what should we do then
besides knowing?’ (o).
Yet the status quo is certainly not charac-
terised by an absence of authoritative power.
Several interviewees emphasised the power-
ful role of the city’s audit agency as a coor-
dinative instrument (d, k, n, q, t). As one
executive said: ‘When things went bad and I
took over from my predecessor, they sent in
the audit court more than 20 times’ (r). Such
audits also have a powerful admonitory
effect, as one official noted: ‘You become
more aware’ (n). Moreover, even though
they may not be in a position to tell execu-
tives what to do, two officials (a, k) noted
that they have the authority to replace exec-
utives if ‘things go wrong’. ‘Your steering
problem then turns into a staffing problem,
and that is one you can solve’ (k), for exam-
ple by simply not renewing the fixed-term
contracts of executives (a) or by ending them
prematurely. This, however, is only used as
a last resort: One should ‘only call the fire
brigade where things are on fire’ (u).
Shadow of quasi-horizontal power
In most cases, city organisations have per-
formance contracts with the city (h, p, g, v),
foremost perhaps the ÖPNV-Vertrag. This
contractual agreement regulates the perfor-
mance of the public transportation provider,
in particular the financial compensation for
infrastructure investments, operational sup-
port and ‘extra services’ such as the annual
ticket priced at e365. In addition, manage-
ment contracts specify financial incentives
for managers and performance-related sal-
aries (g, h, s). However, performance targets
do not seem to play a big role in daily coor-
dination, as one executive admitted: ‘We
hardly talk about objectives’ (g). One man-
ager was not even sure whether he had
signed a performance contract with the city
(p). Nevertheless, audits are carried out to
assess the achievement of goals.
Bargaining, however, is critical ‘when it
comes to money’ (v), as this ‘is always the
best lever for the administration’ in negotia-
tions with city organisations (j). The finan-
cial department allocates the lump-sum
budgets as well as additional grants to help
with budget overrides. One interviewee
noted that due to the reliance of many city
organisations on this funding, they ‘don’t
look for trouble with the CFO’ (t), since ‘if I
need money, I have to negotiate with the
finance director’ (g). Another interviewee
emphasised the strength of the administra-
tion’s purchasing power, especially vis-à-vis
organisations that could not rely on market
revenues (such as transportation, energy
etc.): As the sole buyer for the services pro-
vided by these organisations, the
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administration exerts ‘control through fund-
ing and its purchasing power’ (t).
In sum, our study finds a particular pat-
tern in the combination of diverse coordina-
tive mechanisms, which is not simply ‘loose’
and context dependent (Sarapuu et al., 2014)
but rather follows a more general logic. In
the following section, we will discuss our
findings in the light of extant literature.
Discussion
Our investigation reveals mechanisms in
domestic coordination that relate to both
the ‘structural’ and ‘cultural’ dimension of
coordination (Lægreid and Rykkja, 2015).
Thus we find hierarchical authority-based
mechanisms, resulting from ownership or
supervisory rights. These include delegating
representatives to supervisory boards, far-
reaching reporting requirements and the
imposing of audits. In addition, we note a
number of market-type mechanisms, such as
performance contracts, financial incentives
and performance-related pay. In terms of
cultural mechanisms, which correspond to
the network mode, we find a high level of
identification with the city’s ethos and meta-
goals; similarly, the role of socialisation with
the city administration is key. Both factors
fuel a shared identity and considerable infor-
mal relations between individuals that can
bypass formal structures, reflecting the third
‘clan’ or network mode of coordination.
Our case reflects the complex and highly
differentiated structures of most modern cit-
ies. From an organisational perspective, the
identified level of differentiation mirrors a
highly diverse set of tasks ranging from
health and social care to energy provision,
water supply, social housing and public
transportation. In order to achieve effective
organisation, integrative mechanisms have
to overcome the centripetal implications of
differentiation, requiring an ‘appropriate
balance between any given level of
differentiation and the scope and combina-
tion of integrative devices’ (Hinings et al.,
2018: 339). It is thus no surprise that the
coordinative mechanisms for domestic inte-
gration are equally complex and diverse.
Indeed, we find interplay of mechanisms
from all three modes – hierarchy, market
and network. Drawing on previous studies
on the governance of public organisations,
we began with the insight that the coordina-
tion of domestic city organisations is hybrid,
involving a mixed and ambiguous order of
hierarchy, market and network mechanisms
(Lægreid and Rykkja, 2015; Lægreid et al.,
2015, 2016; Sarapuu et al., 2014). The ques-
tion of how coordination modes are com-
bined and interlinked is still ‘without a clear
answer’ (Cristofoli et al., 2017: 275).
Rule of people and culture, latency of
structures
Cultural mechanisms appear more dominant
than the structural dimension. This is
reflected by officials’ views that central con-
trol is elusive: The administration simply
lacks authority and information to govern
city organisations via directives and con-
tracts. For this reason, people seem more
important in domestic coordination than
structures. In suggesting that structural
mechanisms are used much less frequently
than their cultural counterparts, our study
echoes previous findings that cultural
mechanisms are the ‘efficient secret’ and the
‘most powerful cement’ in the organisational
architecture (see Hood, 2005: 32).
Nevertheless, both vertical (hierarchy)
and horizontal (market) structural mechan-
isms are present – a feature of organisational
structures that Mayntz (2004), albeit in a dif-
ferent context, described as ‘latency’. While
latent structures are used less often than
other forms of coordination, they can be eas-
ily activated when needed (for example, sack-
ing an executive or renegotiating a service
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contract). At the same time, our study shows
the ineffectiveness of cultural coordination in
isolation, whether via people or informal
channels of communication: Even if unsuita-
ble as the sole coordinative approach, latent
structural instruments need to be established
in order to supplement cultural coordination.
In the quest for a ‘workable balance’
(Lægreid et al., 2016: 257) between structural
and cultural mechanisms, we therefore for-
mulate the following proposition:
While domestic coordination is generally depen-
dent on a rule of people and culture, structural
mechanisms of coordination can be described as
latent, i.e. they can be activated when needed
but are less frequently used than their cultural
counterparts.
Demonstrating ‘yes, we can’: Latent
structures as the shadow of power
Latent structures are in play not only when
activated but also through their suggestive
force – an observation that, with a focus on
vertical structures, has been described as the
‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf, 1997: 202).
This credible threat that the administration
might utilise its structural powers has a sig-
nificant coordinating effect. Such power is
not founded merely on authority (vertical)
but also on contractual purchase power
(horizontal), both unfolding in the shadow
of hierarchy as, of course, the administration
can always choose to ‘withdraw its delega-
tion’ (Peters and Pierre, 2016: 110; ‘quasi-
market’: Hood, 2005: 33). Mayntz (2004)
compared such a powerful shadow with a
‘fleet in being’, which can exert influence
without ever leaving port.
Undoubtedly, the administration must keep
the threat of using its power (i.e. the shadow)
alive by occasionally demonstrating that it is
actually ‘able and willing’ (Mensi-Klarbach
et al., 2019: 12) to exert its authority and, fur-
ther, ensure that this is noticed. Structural
influence is thus used by the administration
from time to time: Management compensation
may be cut when performance targets are not
met, even if the monitoring of objectives is oth-
erwise fairly irrelevant to coordination; and
sometimes executives are sacked. Extending
previous insights on the impact of the shadow
of hierarchy in coordination (Brandtner et al.,
2017; Levelt and Metze, 2014; Peters and
Pierre, 2016), we derive a second proposition
as follows:
Latent structures represent a shadow of power that
needs to be maintained by regular activation.
‘Meta-governance’: Cultural coordination
thrives in the shadow of structures
A meta-governance perspective considers
the interplay between and combinations of
governance modes (Bevir, 2009; Kooiman
and Jentoft, 2009). Bridging this perspective
with the shadow-of-hierarchy argument and
applying it to hybrid coordination, Voets
et al. (2015: 981) discussed two alternative
strategies which a ‘smart’ administration
may choose: ‘hands on’, i.e. building on
structural mechanisms, or ‘hands off’, i.e.
relying on cultural mechanisms and what we
refer to as the shadow of structures. Here we
suggest a more nuanced view, namely that
cultural and structural mechanisms are not
alternative choices but rather mutually
dependent dimensions of coordination
(Lægreid and Rykkja, 2015). Cultural
mechanisms, we argue, work best with a
structural fall-back option to keep every-
body in line. Structural mechanisms are
most effective when they work in the back-
ground as unobtrusive but effective sha-
dows; as the default setting for domestic
coordination, they would soon exhaust their
own capacity (‘elusive’).
Hybrid coordination can be described as
a specific configuration of different govern-
ance modes, thereby avoiding a more restric-
tive ‘either-or’ selection (Lægreid et al.,
2015; Sarapuu et al., 2014). Considering the
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meta-governance question of their ‘smart
combination’ (Lægreid et al., 2015: 935), we
suggest that a sophisticated form of adminis-
trative coordination is to reject the false
choice between hands-off vs. hands-on stra-
tegies (Voets et al., 2015), instead striving to
balance mutually-dependent cultural and
structural coordinative mechanisms. Of
course, this is a delicate undertaking, as an
excess of structural coordination may dis-
rupt cultural mechanisms such as trust (see
Van Thiel et al., 2012). Our third proposi-
tion therefore reads as follows:
In isolation, structural coordination is elusive
and cultural coordination ineffective. Yet in
combination, cultural mechanisms relieve struc-
tural coordination while structural mechanisms
provide the shadow in which cultural coordina-
tion thrives.
Concluding remarks
Our study opens the black box of hybrid
coordination between the core administra-
tion and domestic city organisation, as well
as shedding light on the interrelations
between the governance modes of hierarchy,
market and network. By revealing the rule
of people and culture in domestic coordina-
tion under the shadow of structural power,
we elucidate the dilemma of hybrid, yet
ambiguous, domestic coordination in the
neglected context of cities. This contribu-
tion, however, comes with a caveat. While
we argue that Vienna is an exemplary case,
and that our findings are relevant for other
structurally devolved cities, it may be that
pluralised domestic city organisations are
characteristic of the continental-European
tradition, where delegated governance is less
associated with private businesses and non-
profit initiatives than with legally indepen-
dent organisations that are owned or super-
vised by cities. Future research could thus
not only take into account the plurality of
these organisations, but also apply a
comparative perspective across administra-
tive traditions in order to assess the generali-
sability of our results. Later studies should
also extend our focus from domestic coordi-
nation to cities’ collaboration with external
actors. In addition, scholars could investigate
how hybrid urban governance relates to a
city’s capacity for resilience, i.e. the ability to
deal with external shocks. Here we would
expect that the dominance of cultural
mechanisms facilitates swift reactions to criti-
cal events (Kornberger et al., 2019). Yet the
associated lack of cultural diversity may limit
the range of likely responses as well as a
city’s potential for learning and adaptive
change.
We believe that our study adds an organi-
sational perspective to the wider theme of
‘neoliberal’ transformation in urban studies
(Harvey, 1989) and its political-economic
focus on the market-oriented restructuring
of cities (Brenner and Theodore, 2005; for
an overview, see Pinson and Journel, 2016).
As a central pillar of liberalising reforms,
NPM promoted the establishment of inde-
pendent organisations as a way to replace
bureaucracy by business-like arrangements.
As our results show, the structural coordina-
tion of city organisations does indeed reflect
a move towards the market mode. But,
paradoxically, it also documents the sustain-
ing of hierarchical coordination, albeit in a
modified form: City administrations have
discovered not only market-type mechan-
isms but also novel hierarchy-based instru-
ments such as ownership and ownership-like
supervisory rights. So even if the emergence
of domestic city organisations results from a
liberalising reform agenda, cities like Vienna
do not appear lost in a ‘neo-liberal jungle’
(Peck and Tickell, 1994). On the contrary,
the introduction of market-type mechanisms
seems to have extended cities’ repertoire of
structural coordination. Indeed, this has
proved critical for the successful balancing
of cultural mechanisms.
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